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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the behavior of Air Force enlisted personnel who were 
eligible for early voluntary separation under one of two monetary incentive 
programs during FY92. The two programs were the VSI (Voluntary Separation 
Incentive) and the SSB (Special Separation Bonus). The thesis uses data provided 
by the Defense Manpower Data Center on eligible enlisted Air Force personnel for 
FY92. The objectives of the thesis are: (1) to identify the factors that influence 
the voluntary separation decision; (2) to identify the factors that influence the 
choice decision between the two programs; and (3) to compare FY92 Air Force 
results in this thesis with FY92 Navy results to determine if the same factors are 
consistent for both branches. Multivariate logit models were estimated to explain 
the decision to accept a voluntary separation incentive and the decision, among 
acceptors, of which program to accept. Recommendations regarding future 
implementation of the separation programs and for. future research are 
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1. PUrpose of Thesis 
The beginning of fiscal year 1992 marked the onset of 
a major policy change for the armed forces of the United 
States. This change was the use for the first time of 'exit 
bonuses.• The headlines for the January 13, 1992 issue of Navy 
Times read as follows; "EXIT BONUSES, 4,100 sailors, 965 
Marines could qualify in 1992. Services told to o:t:ter 
payments before making :force-outs." The headlines for the 
February 10, 1992 issue of the Air Force Times read: "EXI'l' 
BONUS OR RIF?" These exit bonuses later became known as the 
Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) and the Special 
Separation Bonus ( SSB) Programs. Submitted by personnel 
service planners, approved and accepted by the Department of 
Defense, these programs were contained in the 1992 National 
Defense Authorization Act as an important policy tool of DoD's 
force reductiQn strategy. 
As a result of the FY92 National Defense Authorization 
Act, the Department of Defense faced a large scale personnel 
strength reduction. The bonus programs were implemented in an 
effort to achieve the required 15 percent drawdown by FY95 and 
avoid involuntary separations. The expected result of the 
programs was to persuade selected members to resign before 
1 
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becoming retirement eligible. Both programs have since become 
important policy tools of DoD's overall efforts to meet the 
desired force strength and, in the case of some services, to 
establish a desired force structure. 
This thesis provides an analysis of the results obtained 
by the Air Force from the initial offerings of the two 
programs to eligible enlisted service me~ers. The thesis 
specifically models the factors that influence members• 
decisions to voluntarily leave the Air Force. There is also 
a comparison of the response of Air Force and Navy enlisted 
personnel voluntary separations to the VSI/SSB program. 
2. The structure of the VSI/SSB Program 
VSI/SSB was designed to offer monetary incentives to 
mid-careerist to entice them to leave before a possible 
involuntary separation. Given that there was little 
experience with this kind of incentive, DoD had many concerns. 
One of course, was the concern with how successful the 
incentive programs would be in inducing separations. Given 
the high unemployment rate in many regions of the country, 
officials worried that they would not be able to induce the 
required number of members to leave the traditionally secure 
military. on the other hand, planers worried that a 
potential improvement in the economy would cause too many 
service members to leave the military. A drastic improvement 
in the economy coupled with the denial of a member's request 
to voluntarily separate under one of the programs, due to 
2 
criticality of their specialty, would then result in having to 
be ready to promise a minimum twenty year career to . some 
service members after first being told that they were eligible 
[Ref. 1:p. 13]. 
The Department of Defense was given authorization to 
use both the VSI and SSB programs to achieve the desired 
drawdown. DoD established the following eligibility criteria 
for VSI/SSB: 
1.Service member must have completed the initial term of 
enlistment including extensions; 
2.Service member must have served on active duty for more 
than six years, prior to 5 December 1992; 
3.Service member must have served at least five years of 
continuous active duty immediately preceding the 
date of separation; 
4.Service member must have served on active duty, upon 
separation, for less than twenty years and not be 
eligible for retired or retainer pay; 
5.Service member must be a regular or a reservist on the 
active duty list. 
3. Air Force Implementation 
At the onset of DoD's force reduction strategy, the 
Air Force, unlike some of the other branches of the Armed 
Services, was facing the possibility of implementing a 
RIF{Reduction in Force), that is an involuntary separation, to 
meet end strength goals. The implementation of VSI/SSB 
encouraged those service members most vulnerable to the 
potential RIF to accept one of the two programs. The Air 
Force utilized enlisted specialty codes, as well as pay grade 
3 
and years of service as the criteria for the exit bonuses. 
These same criteria were used as a measure of vulnerability to 
a RIF, as some specialty codes were decreasing in importance 
to the Air Force structure. The exit bonuses were targeted to 
E-4s and E-Ss with at least nine years of service 
[Ref. 2: p. 3] • 
The specialty codes included in the eligible group 
encompassed a wide range, from the most critical and 
undermanned to those that were over-manned due changes in 
force structure and mission. The first tier (most critical) 
of specialty codes were ineligible to apply for a separation 
program, but were also exempt from a possible RIF. Those in 
the second tier of specialty codes were encouraged to take 
advantage of the exit bonuses. Everyone from the second tier 
codes through the fifth tier were encouraged to apply for one 
of the bonuses, as the chances of RIF increased with the tier 
number. [Ref. 2:p. 3) 
The majority of the bonuses were offered to sergeants 
and staff sergeants with nine to 19 years of service. This 
same pay grade with nine to fourteen years of service also 
would have been the targets for RIF, if implemented. 
B. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
In an effort to meet required end strength reductions, 
decision makers were forced to stop and realize that their 
efforts could drastically change the lives of those who 
4 
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originally had volunteered to serve their country and who were 
now in mid-career. The current drawdown is the largest since 
the end of the Vietnam War and the initiation of the All-
Volunteer Force in 1973. Manpower planners faced a critical 
stage as the Air Force had to eliminate personnel who 
••• were led to believe that if they performed 
in a satisfactory manner, they would be allowed 
to complete a normal career and retire with an 
immediate pension (Ref. J:p. 127]. 
However the reality of the diminished Soviet threat and 
reduced defense spending forced reductions in manpower. The 
Air Force has many tools in which to accomplish this task and 
still maintain the integrity of the military, not only in its 
service member's eyes, but also in the eyes of the public. 
This thesis focuses on one method used by the Air Force, 
separation incentives, namely the Voluntary Separation 
Incentive{VSI) and the Special Separation Bonus{SSB). The 
analysis of the thesis focuses on enlisted Air Force personnel 
who were eligible for the VSI/SSB program during FY92. The 
thesis analyzes the factors that influence the acceptance 
decision and compares the results for Air Force personnel with 
those results found for Navy personnel. 
C. THESIS QUESTIONS 
The primary concern of the thesis deals with determining 
which factors significantly influence an individual's decision 
to accept a voluntary separation incentive program. Other 
concerns include: 
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1. What differences exist in the effects of the 
determinants of separation between Air Force and Navy enlisted 
personnel eligible for VSI/SSB? 
2. Are there variables that can be used to develop a 
valid forecasting model of the "take-rate" for future 
offerings of the t\,'O programs? 
3. Are the VSI and SSB programs successful and cost 
effective force shaping tools? 
4. could the future use of VSI and SSB, beyond FY95, be 
successful considering its past success and the 
characteristics of future groups who may become eligible? 
Questions 1 and 2 are addressed in Chapters III and IV. 
General observations about quesitons 3 and 4 are found in the 
conclusions chapter. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The data for the population of bonus eligibles for 
enlisted Air Force personnel were obtained from the Defense 
Manpower Data C~nter (DMDC). The data set was created by 
combining the set of Air Force enlisted personnel who were 
eligible for the VSI/SSB offerings in FY92 with information on 
individuals who were approved and accepted separation under 
one of the separation incentive programs. 
A multivariate data analysis was performed to study the 
effects of the factors that influence the decision of enlisted 
Air Force personnel to stay or voluntarily separate under an 
incentive program, and also to measure the independent effect 
of each variable on the stay or leave decision. The results 
of the analysis for Air Force personnel was compared to Navy 
personnel. The dependent variables in the analysis measure 
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each individual's decision of whether to participate in one of 
the two p-rograms, and also which program to select. The 
independent variables used are socioeconomic variables 
reflecting one • s potential earnings under the military and 
civilian options. That is, the variables att•empt to capture 
the service member's cost of leaving in the face of a 
separation bonus. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter 
establishing 
II provides a 
the theoretical 
detailed literature review 
framework for the thesis. 
Various studies of retention, strength reductions, re-
enlistment bonuses and downsizing are reviewed to analyze 
similarities and differences in the factors used in these 
studies, and to determine the factors affecting the decision 
behavior for the two incentive programs. Chapter III explains 
the methodology applied in the thesis, describes the data and 
develops the research questions. 
Chapter IV analyzes the factors affecting the separation 
bonus decision. Included in this chapter is a comparative 
analysis of the take-rates of VSI/SSB between Air Force and 
Navy enlisted personnel. This chapter also contains an 
interpretation of model estimates and the predictive accuracy 
of the models. Chapter V summarizes the conclu$ions from the 
modeling results. This chapter cites those variables having 
significant effect on take-rates and the predictive accuracy 
7 
of the model. Strengths, weaknesses and recommendations for 
future study conclude the thesis. 
8 
II. LITDA'l'UilB RIIVID 
A. DISCUSSIOII 
As previously stated and emphasized in the introduction, 
at the beginning of the drawdown, the Department of Defense 
faced an extremely difficult task in reaching the desired end 
strength reductions. This task is 1 180° out • from the 
emphasis on retention and attrition which began with the 
advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973 and the 
sustained build up during the 1980's. During the 1980s, 
military planners realized that manpower requirements could 
not be met without increasing reenlistments and reducing 
attrition. Now, with the emphasis on downsizing of the force, 
planners encountered much difficulty on reaching the desired 
goals. This reduction of the armed forces was inevitable. 
Politicians were determined to make large cuts in defense even 
before the fall of the Soviet Union. The level of defense 
funding in the 1980s, approximately six percent of GNP, was no 
longer acceptable. (Ref. J:p. 4] 
Shaping size has actually been an ongoing process. 
Voluntary separation has been the mechanism to maintain force 
sizes. Due to the fact that involuntary separations are 
politically unacceptable, manpower planners and analysts were 
forced to direct their attention to the study of separation 
9 
behavior and the potential effects of separation incentive 
policies on voluntary turnover. 
B. RBVIBW 01' VOLUftARY TUUOVBR STUDIBS 
Stolzenberg and Winkler (1983), in their studies 
concerning causes of voluntary terminations from the military 
and the civilian labor force, made an effort to determine 
which factors {variables) best explain "quit" behavior. Their 
findings concluded that although pecuniary factors influence 
the decision to leave the military service, the non-pecuniary 
factors exceed the influence of pay and benefits on the 
decision to leave. The complex nature of the military's ~ay 
and/or compensation system makes its influence on voluntary 
separations difficult to identify. Service members tend to 
underestimate their true compensation, due to the complexity 
of the system. This promotes difficulty in assessing total 
effect of compensation on the quit decision. (Ref. S:p. 41] 
The author also found that first-term enlisted personnel 
consider their current pay to be of more importance than non-
pecuniary factors, which are considered to be of more 
importance to career personnel. In a comparison of lump-sum 
bonus payments and equivalent funds paid out in installments, 
military personnel tend to favor the lump-sum bonus payment. 
(Ref. S:p. 61] 
In the authors' conclusions, job security is a major 
10 
factor in reducing voluntary turnover from the military. 
Given the time frame of their study, prior to the current 
downsizing, job security was not an issue. Service members 
felt quite secure in the military as a constant source of 
income, a full career and substantial retirement benefits. 
It was a given that the military could not only promise these 
incentives, but also deliver them. However, the drawdown has 
created a great deal of uncertainty amongst service members. 
With this in mind, members are less secure concerning their 
careers and are taking long hard looks at the benefits of 
leaving and weighing this against the likelihood chances of 
being able to stay. 
One major factor in a member's decision to leave is his 
or her marketability and chances of finding a comparable job 
(pay), in the civilian sector. Lakhani, Hyder (1988) 
conducted a three stage least squares analysis of 1981 u.s. 
Army data relating "quit rates," to retention bonuses and 
military pay in combat MOSs and non-combat MOSs (Ref. 6]. 
Lakhani hypothesized that soldiers in combat occupations 
receive specialized training, while soldiers in non-combat 
occupations receive more generalized training, which is 
readily transferable to the civilian sector. This would 
encourage a higher reenlistment response to bonuses by 
soldiers in combat MOSs. However, combat MOSs have higher 
pecuniary costs than that of non-combat MOSs, due to physical 
labor and danger. Subsequently, leave rates are expected to 
11 
be higher. On the other hand, skills gained by soldiers in 
combat fields are not as marketable as those attained in non-
combat fields in the civilian sector. Assuming this to be 
true leaves two questions that each soldier must answer in 
weighing the separation decision: Am I marketable? If so, How 
much am I worth? 
Since marketability does not necessarily equate to high 
civilian earnings, a service member may decide to remain on 
active duty, and not accept a separation incentive. Given the 
range in years of service, from nine to nineteen, this type of 
thinking probably differs greatly between service members. 
Younger members would most likely accept the lump sum, in 
hopes of going to college and furthering their education. 
More senior members would most likely accept the annuity, with 
their attention directed towards starting a second civilian 
career. Based on human capital theory, as these senior 
members enter the civilian labor market they would be willing 
to allocate (invest) part of their time and effort to the 
production of skills (i.e., training or formal education). 
This tends to lower observed earnings initially, but increase 
earnings in the future. Therefore, human capital theory 
implies that investment in learning directly steepens the 
slope of the age/earnings profile. 
C. ACOL (ADUALIZBD COST 01' LBAVIRG) KODBL 
The u.s. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and 
12 
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Social Sciences (ARI) performed an analysis examining 
soldiers• responses to the two programs (VSI and SSB) and 
identified factors affecting soldiers• decisions to separate. 
The analysis used data from the Survey of Total Army Military 
Personnel (STAMP), which was mailed to 51, ooo active and 
reserve soldiers after Operation Desert Shield/Storm. STAMP 
covered many topics including, morale, leadership, training, 
organizational commitment, career plans, training, adequacy of 
mobilization, and reactions to personnel policies such as VSI. 
Since STAMP's topic coverage was so broad, the data supported 
assessment of soldiers' reactions to separation incentives and 
their responses to variables in the Annualized Cost of Leaving 
Model (ACOL) • After examining correlations between ACOL 
variables and separation incentives, the following conclusions 
were drawn to evaluate alternative Army reenlistment models: 
(1) Reenlistment models are a sound bases for understanding 
members' decisions about early separation incentives, ( 2) 
years of service and rank relate significantly to members• 
separation decisions, and (3) members• race and gender do not 
affect their decisions. [Ref. 7] 
ACOL Model states that for an individual with t years of 
service, the returns or benefits for remaining with the 
military for s additional years are: 
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where: RS, is the expected present value of income from an 
additional s years with the military; 
~is military pay in year j, j•t, ••• t+s; 
~+• is the expectc· d present value of retirement income 
for serving t+s years; 
w,+, is the expected present value of civilian income 
after serving t+s years; and 
dis 1/(1+p) where pis the individual's rate of time 
preference. [Ref. 11:p. 25] 
In comparison to the returns from staying in the military 
there are also returns from leaving (RL), immediately. These 
returns can be stated as: 
where ~ and ~ are the present value of retirement income and 
civilian wages, respecti.vely, for leaving at time t. The stay 
or leave decision is based on a comparison of RS and RL. If 
RS>RL, the benefits from staying outweigh the benefits from 
leaving, thus a rational decision can be made to reenlist. 
Thus far, the model has not taken into account non-
pecuniary factors. Let k equal a measure of the individual 
preference for the non-pecuniary aspects of military versus 
civilian life. In this case the reenlistment decision can be 
thought of as; 
RS+k>RL 
If total financial and non financial benefits are greater than 
the financial benefits of leaving the military, the individual 
will reenlist. Note that the financial benefits from leaving 
could exceed those from staying, but the individual could 
14 
still make the decision to reenlist because k indicates a 
positive attitude toward army life. 
Placing the ACOL model in perspective, the following 
model specification represents a service member in tiers 2 and 
3, (eligible for an exit bonus, and not likely to get forced 
out in the event of a RIF) • This presents a problem in 
considering what it would cost someone who would otherwise 
make a positive decision, RS+k>RL, to leave the military. 
There is a financial cost of leaving (COL) which can be 
defined as: 
COL = RS - RL 
For someone in this situation to leave the military, they 
would have to be offered an early financial separation 
incentive (ESI), that is greater then their COL. 
ESI > RS - RL 
If non-pecuniary factors are considered, then; 
ESI > RS - RL + k 
Realizing that at the time an offer is made there is no 
retirement benefit applicable, the return obtained from a 
person deciding to leave can be stated as follows; 
RL = w; since R = o and 
ESI > RS - W + k 
D. DBPARTKDJ'l' 01' DBI'DISB PLU 
The proposed and approved cuts in military personnel are 
drastic. With the enactment of VSI/SSB and possible force-
15 
outs, the Defense Department by 1995, will have reduced the 
active duty force to approximately 1.6 million sailors, 
soldiers, airmen, and Marines. From peak strength in 1987, 
this figure will be down by 530,000. [Ref. 4:p. 64] Table 
2-2 displays the end strength for each branch. The offering 
of the two programs differed widely in size and focus across 
the services. This was mainly due to varying rates of 
progress towards the 1995 drawdown. The Air Force had 
previously met its reduction goals with the use of various 
personnel reduction tools. But if deeper reductions were 
ordered, force-outs {involuntary separations), would become 
almost unavoidable. 
Involuntary separation is a technical term, 
says Lt. Gen. Billy J. Boles, USAF deputy 
chief of staff for Personnel. Many of the 
people who are taking VSI or SSB want to stay 
in the Air Force, but they understand that if 
they stay, they are very likely to be forced 
out with less compensation than if they leave 
voluntarily. [Ref. a:p. 7] 
Projected extensive budget cuts in National Defense 
spending, with the most significant cut directed towards the 
Department of Defense, is the driving force in personnel 




PREDICTED DEFENSE SPENDING, 1993-1998 
(Billions) 
l&a•~ ISHEi~J: 1!U illi .an 1lli 1!!1. lUI 
DOD Military 259.1 250.7 248.1 240.3 232.8 240.5 
DOB & other 13.9 12.7 13.0 13.4 13.2 13.4 
Total 273.0 263.4 261.1 253.7 246.0 253.9 
Annual Percent -8.5 -5.0 -3.0 -5.1 -5.0 o.o 
Change (1993 Dollars) 
0!11;layt 
DOD Military 277.3 264.2 258.0 251.6 233.7 239.2 
Total 290.7 276.9 270.9 264.7 246.9 252.5 
Annual Percent -5.6 -6.6 -4.3 -4.5 -8.9 o.o 
Change (1993 Dollars) 
Source: Secretary of Defense DOD press release, 27 March 1993 
These dollar cuts explain the projected personnel 
drawdown as seen in Table 2-2. Although Table 2-2 may 
be outdated, seeing that it dates back to 1987, its• 
projections are most relevant to the VSI/SSB decision 
being analyzed. 
TABLE 2-2 
PROJECTED MANPOWER CUTS,1987-1995 
AND 1987-1997 
(End strength in thousands) 
I'Y CbaDqe, I'Y I'Y I'Y 
1987 1987-95 1995 1997 1987-97 
Total active-duty 2,174 -530 1,644 1,626 -548 
Air Force 607 -178 429 430 -177 
Army 781 -245 536 536 -245 
Marine Corps 199 -29 170 159 -40 
Navy 587 -78 509 501 -86 
Selected Reserves 1,151 -229 922 920 -.:"11 
CiviliaDS 1,133 -221 912 904 -229 
Source: Air Force Magazine 1 April 1992 
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As outlined by the fiscal year 1992 National Defense 
Authorization Act, those members qualified for and approved 
for voluntary separation faced the decision as to which 
payment benefit option they would accept in exchange for 
voluntary leaving active duty. What follows is an overview of 
the two programs. 
The Volun~.ary Separation Incentive (VSI) program 
provides an annuity type payment based on the following 
formula: 
(final month's 
Annual VSI amount =(2.5 percent) x base pay) x (12) x (YOS) 
(where the total number of payments is equivalent to twice the 
member's years of service.) 
Under the VSI option, the service member is obligated 
to serve in the Ready Reserves for as long as the period of 
the VSI payments. VSI payments are also affected by any 
military retirement or reserve drill pay, which is deducted 
from VSI. The Special Separation Bonus ( SSB) program provides 
a lump sum cash payment based on the following formula: 
(final month's 
Total SSB payment = (15 percent) x base pay) x (12) x (YOS) 
Under the SSB option, the service member is obligated to serve 
three years in the Ready Reserves. Also, SSB recipients will 
have to pay back certain amounts at the time military 
retirement payments begin. 
Table 2-3 provides a comparison of dollar value 
18 
amounts by payqrade(E-4 to E-7) and YOS (nine to fourteen 
years) for the lump-sum versus the annuity. Also included are 
present value calculations for each payqrade at each year 
point. To provide a reasonable comparison of the two 
programs • current dollar values, a seven percent rate of 
interest was used. 
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Table 2-3 
PRESENT VALUE OF LUMP-SUM (SSB) VERSUS 
ANNUITY (VSI) SEPARATION BONUS 
Years of Service 
~13£9!;:i!de .2. lQ .11 ll ll ll 
1::.! 
SSB 19,702 21,892 26,081 26,270 28,459 30,648 
VSI 
Annual 3,284 3,649 4,013 4,378 4,743 5,108 
# of Years 18 20 22 24 26 28 
Total 59,107 72,972 88,296 105,080 12:-,323 143,025 
Present 
Value 35,344 61,359 ",501 53,732 60,018 66,337 
B-5 
SSB 22,283 25,742 28,316 32,024 34,693 38,042 
VSI 
Annual 3,714 4,290 4, 719 5,337 5,782 6,340 
# of Years 18 20 22 24 26 28 
Total 66,849 85,806 103,825 128,097 150,336 177,529 
Pre seat 
Value 39,973 48,633 55,856 65,501 73,165 82,340 
1::! 
SSB 26,456 28,172 30,989 35,549 38,512 42,774 
VSI 
Annual 4,076 4,695 5,165 5,925 6,419 7,129 
# of Years 18 20 22 24 26 28 
Total 73,367 93,906 113,625 142,197 166,884 199,614 
Present 
Value 63,870 53,224 61,128 72,711 81,219 92,583 
E-7 
SSB 27,626 31,676 34,844 39,198 62,664 ",802 
VSI 
Annual 4,604 5,279 5,807 6,533 7,077 7,967 
# of Years 18 20 22 24 26 28 
Total 82,873 105,588 127,761 156,790 184,011 223,075 
Present 
Value 69,554 59,845 68,733 eo, 173 89,554 103,665 
Source: Department of Defense office of compensation 
* Discount rate used to calculate present value is 7 percent 
As denoted by the highlighted figures, the present value of 
VSI payments greatly exceed the lump-sum value of SSB. None-
theless SSB, as will be discussed later, was the more popular 
of the two. 
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Approval for either of the two separation programs is 
based on the member's eligibility and qualification for the 
program. Eligibility requirements are based on years of 
service (YOS), rating and paygrade. There are exceptions to 
this ~ule concerning the Air Force which will be addressed 
later. Members must also be eligible for reenlistment, not on 
limited duty, not in training for an ineligible specialty code 
and not awaiting disciplinary action or administrative 
separation. 
E. AIR PORCE VSI/SSB IMPLEMENTATION 
Restructuring of the Air Force, according to some service 
leaders, was long over due. "The structure adopted 45 years 
ago no longer represented the most logical and efficient 
organization of either forces or missions". (Ref. 9] Unlike 
the Navy, the Air Force at the onset of the drawdown was 
facing a possible reduction in force (RIF), that is 
involuntary separation. The implementation of the VSI/SSB was 
definitely a life saver for the •powers that be' in the Air 
Force. General Boles, Air Force Chief of Staff for Personnel 
stated, 
Today•s services are made up entirely of 
volunteers, most of whom want to stay for full 
careers. To some extent we are victims of our 
own success. We have worked hard to improve 
retention by making the Air Force an 
attractive way of life. These very efforts 
now complicate efforts to draw down the force. 
(Ref. 9 :p. 40] 
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Although VSI/SSB was implemented, the possibility of a RIF was 
not totally eliminated. It was placed on hold awaiting the 
result~ of the programs. If the desired amount of takers did 
not come forth, the RIF was the second alternative. 
The Air Force was concerned about end strength reductions 
as far back as 1986. They actually got a jump on the other 
services by implementing the following policies in 1986: 
1. recruiting reduced 
2. retirements accelerated 
3. voluntary separations encouraged 
General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, hoped 
that these efforts would continue to work and meet the 
drawdown requirements. In addition to the 1986 efforts, the 
Air Force in 1992 also implemented more policy changes: 
1. lower high year tenure(HYT) points for top non-
commissioned officers by 2-3 years, 
2. E-8's must leave at 26 years 
3. E-7's must leave at 23 years 
4. E-5/6's must leave at 20 years 
5. Chiefs still can stay up to 30 years, but not beyond 
6. E-4's who have not made E-5 by 10 years must leave 
These cutbacks definitely accounted for substantial losses in 
1992. Total losses included approximately 900 senior officers 
through SERBS (Selective Early Retirement Boards), 1,500 E-4s 
(ten-year rule), 800 airmen denied reenlistment, and 2,900 
NCO's due to the lowering of HYT points [Ref. 10:p. 38]. 
Still these losses were only a fraction of the losses needed. 
The Air Force offered VSI/SSB to 300,000 personnel in 
hopes that at least 26,400 (21,600 enlisted and 4,800 
officers), would accept. The Air Force's first deadline for 
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acceptance of applications was January 31, 1992. The second 
deadline was April 15, 1992. The tarqet for offerin.CJs of 
VSI/SSB was directed towards E-4s (Senior Airmen1 , Serqeant2), 
and E-5s with 9-19 years of service, most NCOs at bases marked 
for closure and most of the officer corps. In addition to 
these criteria, the proqrams were only offered to certain 
specialty codes. 
As stated in the introduction, the Air Force utilized a 
tier system rankinq from 1 to 5 to qroup eliqible Air Force 
Specialty Codes (AFSC). AFSCs in tier one were not eliqible 
for an exit bonus and were not vulnerable to a RIF. Those 
AFSCs in tier five were most susceptible to beinq forced out 
if they did not voluntarily leave. To maintain required 
manninq levels, each specialty code had a maximum number of 
exit bonuses to be approved [Ref. 2]. The followinq tables 
list the specialties in the Enlisted Air Force and express the 
relation between AFSCs and tier qroups. 
1After May 1, 1992, all promotions are to E-4 serqeant. 



























ENLISTED AIR FORCE 
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES 
crirtt two digit• of APSC) 
caner rield ~ can•~: ri•J.t 
Pirst Sergeant 56 Sanitation 
Aircraw Operations 57 Pire Protection 
Aircraw Protection 59 Marine 
Intelligence 60 Transportation 
Geodetic 61 commissary Services 
Visual Information 62 Service• 
Safety 63 Fuels 
Weather 64 Supply 
Command COntrol Syeteme 65 contracting 
Operation• 66 Logietics Plans 
Communications-Electronics 67 Financial 
Syttems 70 Information 
Inetrumentation Management 
Precision Measurement 73 Personnel 
Training Devices 74 Morale, Welfare 
Wire Communications & Recreation 
Systems Management 75 Education and 
Maintenance Management Training 
Systems 79 Public Affairs 
Intricate Equipment 81 security Police 
Maintenance 82 Special 
Missile Syetems Maintenance Inveetigations 
Manned Aerospace Maintenance 87 Band 
Munitions and Weapons 88 Paralegal 
Vehicle Maintenance 89 Chaplain 
communications-computer Management 
Systems 90-92 Medical 
Mechanical/Electrical 98 Dental 
Structural Pavements 99 Miscellaneous 
(Special Duty, 
Patients, Unclass.) 





AFSCs BY TIER GROUP 
AFSC Tier AFSC Tier AFSC Tier AFSC Tier AFSC Tier 
112XO 1 277XO 1 454X2 4 S4SX1 s 871XOK 1 
113XOB 1 303X1 1 454x3 2 S4SX2 s 871XOL 1 
113XOC 2 303X2 1 454X4 2 S4SX3 s 871XOM 3 
114XO 1 303X3 3 454X4A 2 SS1XO s 871XON 3 
llSXO 1 304XO 1 454XS 2 SS1X1 s 871XOP 3 
116XO 2 304X2 2 454X6 1 SS2XO s 871XOR 4 
117XO 1 304X4 1 4SSXOA 1 SS2X2 5 871XOS s 
118XO 1 304XS 2 4SSXOB 2 SS2XS 5 871XOT s 
118X1 1 304X6 1 4SSX1A 1 553XO 3 871XOV s 
118X2 1 30SX4 1 4SSX1B 2 sssxo 4 872XO 3 
121XO 1 306X6 2 4SSX1C 5 S66XO 4 881XO 1 
122XO 2 309XO 1 4SSX2A 1 S66X1 4 893XO 4 
201XO 1 316X3 1 45SX2B 3 571XO 3 901XO 1 
201X1 1 324XO 1 455X2C 2 591XO 4 902XO 2 
202XO 1 361XO 1 45SX3A 5 591X1 4 902XOA 1 
205XO 1 361X1 1 45SX4 1 602XO 4 902XOB 1 
206XO 2 362X1 2 455X6 5 602X1 5 902X2 1 
207X1 4 362X3 5 456XO 4 603XO 5 902X2B 1 
207X2 1 362X4 2 456X1A 2 60SX5 5 902X2C 1 
208X1A 5 391XO 2 456X1B 2 612XO 5 902X2D 1 
208X2A 1 392XO 1 457XOA 1 612X1 5 903XO 1 
208X2B 1 404XO 4 457XOB 3 623XO 5 903X1 2 
208X2C 1 411XO 2 457XOC 2 631XO 5 904XO 1 
208X2D 1 411XOA 2 457XOD 2 64SXO 5 905XO 1 
208X2E 1 411X1 2 457XOE 2 64SX1 5 906XO 2 
208X3A 1 411X1A 2 457XOP 2 645X2 2 907XO 1 
208X3B 2 411X2 2 457Xl 1 651XO 3 908XO 1 
208X3C 2 411X2A 2 457X2A 1 661XO 2 911XO 1 
208X3D 1 451X4A 5 457X2C 2 672X1 s 912X5 1 
208X3P 1 451X4B 5 457X2D 2 672X2 5 912X5A 1 
208X3J 1 451X5 5 457X2E 1 I;74XO 2 913XO 1 
208X4A 1 451X6A 5 457X3A 1 702XO 5 913X1 1 
208X4B 1 451X6B 5 457X3B 1 703XO 5 914XO 1 
208X4C 1 451X7 2 457X3C 1 73lx0 4 915XO 1 
208X4D 1 452X1A 2 458XO 2 732XO 5 918XO 1 
208X4E 1 452X1B 2 458X1 3 733X1 2 919XO 2 
208X4G 1 452X1C 2 458X2 2 734XOA 1 924XO 1 
208X4J 1 452X2A 1 458X3 2 734XOB 2 924X1 1 
208X5A 1 452X2B 1 461XO 5 741X1 5 925XO 1 
208X5C 1 452X2C 2 462XO 4 742XO 5 926XO 1 
208X5D 1 452X3A 2 463XO 1 751XO 5 981XO 2 
208X5E 1 452X3B 5 464XO 1 751X1 2 982XO 1 
209XO 1 452X3C ~ 46SXO 1 753x0 5 99102 1 
222XO 5 452X4A 2 466XO 1 753X1 2 99103 1 
231XO 4 452X4B 2 472XO 5 791XO 3 99104 1 
231X1 2 452X4C 5 472X1A 4 791X1 1 99105 1 
231X2 2 452X4D 4 472X1B 4 792X2 3 99106 1 
231X3 1 452X4E 4 472X2 4 811XO 4 99500 1 
233XO 4 452X4P 4 472X3 4 811X2 4 99502 1 
241XO 3 452X4G 4 472X4 5 811X2A 5 99503 2 
242XO 2 452X4H 4 491X1 2 821XO 1 99504 2 
251XO 1 452X4J 4 491X2 1 871XOA 1 99505 2 
251XOA 1 452X4K 4 492X1 1 871XOB 5 99600 2 
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271Xl 4 452X4L 4 492X2 2 871XOC 1 99602 1 
271X2 2 452X4M 4 493XO 1 871XOD 1 99603 2 
272XO 1 452x4Z 4 496XO 1 871XOB 3 99604 2 
273XO 1 452X5 2 542XO 4 871XOF 5 99605 2 
274XO 1 454XOA 4 542X1 4 871XOG 5 99606 1 
275XO 1 454XOB 1 542X2 5 871XOB 3 997Xl 2 
276XO 1 454X1 2 545XO 5 871XOJ 5 997X2 2 
997X3 1 
Source a Air Force 
Some specialty codes fell under special categories. Those in 
lOOXO and 997XO were not RIF-eligible, but sergeants and above 
could apply for an exit bonus if assigned to a base that is to 
close and if they were otherwise eligible. Those in 111XO, 
341X2, 341X4, 341X6, 341X7, 455X3B, 456X2 and 99501 were not 
RIF-eligible, but sergeants and above could apply for a bonus 
if otherwise eligible. Those in 99006, 99007 and 99009, who 
are sergeants and above, could apply for a bonus if otherwise 
eligible. Those in 99000, 99001, 99002, 99005, 99008, 99101, 
99107, 99108 and 99704 were not eligible for a bonus. [Ref. 2] 
Most of the bonus offers went to sergeants and staff 
sergeants with 9-19 YOS. The same personnel with 9-14 YOS, 
would make up the RlF pool, if such action became necessary. 
If enough personnel did not pursue voluntary separation during 
the initial phase of offerings of the two programs, the pool 
would be expanded to other specialties and grades in an effort 
to avoid a RIF. [Ref. 2] 
26 
~-~~ - ~---------------------------. 
III. DA!'A AIID IIII'IIIODOLOCJY 
Presented in this section are the details of the 
methodoloqy used to model the stay/leave decision of enlisted 
Air Force personnel eligible for the VSI/SSB program, and to 
model the program choice (VSI/SSB) of those who opted for the 
separation bonus. The construction of the data set is 
discussed along with the behavioral models for these 
decisions. Additionally, the techniques used to estimate the 
models are discussed. 
A. DBSCRIP'l'IO!I OJI 'l'JIB DATA 
The data set was provided by the Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC). It consisted of those enlisted Air Force 
personnel who were eligible for either VSI or SSB under the 
FY9 2 program. As explained in Chapter Two, the program 
initially was restricted by the Air Force to certain specialty 
codes (AFSCs), to certain paygrades (E-4s and E-5s), and years 
of service (9-19). It was later expanded to include more 
AFSCs. The DMDC data set contained 103,489 eligible 
personnel, 21.25 percent of the total Air Force enlisted 
population of 486,800 for FY92 [Ref. 8:p. 26]. Within the 
data set, 14,700 (14.2') individuals accepted VSI or SSB, 
leaving 88,789 personnel who were eligible but did not accept 
a separation bonus. Among the acceptors, 13,553 (92.1') chose 
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the SSB over the VSI option. 
B. KODBL COJI8ftUC'l'IOJI 
Binomial logit models were specified in an effort to 
determine what factors significantly affected the decision to 
accept or not accept a separation bonus and, among takers, 
which bonus to accept. Use of the binomial logit model vice 
the linear probability model avoided the major problems 
encountered when using OLS to estimate models with dummy 
dependent variables. 3 The results of a logit model, vice 
results of a linear probability model, are preferred by 
researchers due, in part, to the non-linear relationship 
between the explanatory variables and tb~ dependent variable. 
[Ref. 11:p. 520] 
Avoiding the unboundness problem of the linear 
probability model made it advantageous to use a logit model 
based on the cumulative logistic function: 
ln Pi = B0 + B1Xli + ~X2i [ 1-Pi] 
where Pi is the probability of satisfying the condition being 
tested for. In which case, any change in the explanatory 
3 1. The error term is not normally distributed. 
2. The error term is inherently heteroskedastic. 
3. Predicted probability of the event is not bounded by o 
and 1. 
4. A linear relationship is imposed. (Ref.11:p.518] 
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variables (Xs) on the right hand side of the equation directly 
effects the 'logit,• or log of the odds of the event on the 
left hand side. In the first model, the observed value of the 
dependent variable equals 1 for and individual who voluntarily 
decides to separate, under one of the programs, and o if the 
individual decides not to take the separation program. In the 
second model, the observed value of the depeh-:. l!nt variable 
equals 1 if the individual decided to take VSI and 0 if the 
individual decided to take SSB. To determine the probability 
that an individual will make the decision corresponding to 
Yi = 1, the binomial logit model utilizes the following 




e = base of the natural logarithm 
80 , B., ~ = parameters to be estimated 
X1, X2 = explanatory variables 
Given the equation above, Pis are the predicted probabilities 
of the condition being satisfied. In this case the model 
coefficients can be used to determine the impact that selected 
independent variables have on the dependent variable (log of 
the odds) 4 that the choice in question will be made. 
[Ref. 11:pp. 518-519] 
Model specification involves choosing the variables that 
4 The ratio of the number of times a choice will be made 
divided by the number of times it will not. 
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are expected to have a significant impact on an individual's 
decision. Based on the literature review and the ACOL model, 
hypotheses were developed to predict the effect of each 
independent variable on the relevant choice variable. In 
comparing the results of the analysis of 1992 Air Force data 
in this thesis, with the analysis of 1992/93 Navy data, the 
variables selected were based on two previous studies: (1) An 
Analysis of Enlisted Early Separation Under the Navy's VSI/SSB 
Program: The Impact of Eligibility and Program Benefits, by 
S.J. Giarrizzo, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1993, 
(Ref.12] and (2) Shrinking the Force: Effects of the Navy's 
Separation Incentive Program, by Stephen L. Mehay and Mary 
Kirby, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993 (Ref. 13]. 
The equations below list the explanatory variables and 
the hypothesized signs of each variable. The hypothesized 
signs are based on the theoretical model and reasoning found 
in Mehay and Kirby (Ref. 13]. Table 3-1 displays the variable 
definitions and how they were coded. 
+ 
TAKE = f(MINORITY, AFQT, 
+ + 
MALE, YOS, GRADE, MARRIED, CHILD, 
+ 
MILSPS, HSD, UNEMP I HI TECH) 
+ + 
VSI = f(MINORITY, AFQT, MALE, YOS, MARRIED, CHILD, MILSPS, 
+ 
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In both the "take" model and the VSI model the 
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hypothesized signs of the variables are similar. The MINORITY 
variable is expected to have a negative effect on TAKE as 
reenlistment rates for minority groups are generally higher 
than those for whites [Ref. 13:p. 45). If the decision of 
minorities reflects fewer employment opportunities in the 
civilian labor market, this would suggest a greater likelihood 
of acceptance of the lump-sum vice the annuity. 5 The effect 
of MALE is hypothesized to be negative because of historically 
higher retention rates of men compared to women [Ref.l3:p.46]. 
YOS and GRADE both are hypothesized to have negative 
coefficients. The closer an individual is to retirement and 
the higher his or her paygrade, the less likely he or she is 
to voluntarily separate. MARRIED and CHILD are hypothesized 
to have negative signs. These two variables reflect family 
responsibilities of the service member, and steady income 
would be extremely important top the individual. 
[Ref. 13:p. 44] MILSPS (which=l if the service member has a 
military spouse), is hypothesized to have a positive effect 
for a number of reasons. First, A military spouse is entitled 
to the same benefits as the member separating. Second, 
managing dual military career families is a difficult task. 
[Ref. 12:p. 30) Third, a spouse's steady income affords the 
separating member the opportunity to voluntary separate and 
begin a second civilian career. HITECH and HSD are both 
s The lump-sum payment could provide a means for a higher 
education awarding an individual the marketability needed in 
the civilian labor market. 
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expected to have positive signs due to increased job 
opportunities as a result of being highly skilled and better 
educated. Conversely, NONGRAD is expected to have a negative 
effect, in the VSI model. The variable UNEMP, the 
unemployment rate in the individual's home state, is expected 
to have a negative effect on separation. Most separating 
service members return to their home of record, i.e., their 
home state, to seek employment. Hence, the chances of finding 
a job may affect their decision [Ref.13:p.49] 
C. MARGINAL PROBABILITIES 
The next step after model estimation is to determine the 
individual effect of each explanatory variable, and its impact 
on the probability of accepting a separation bonus. Also the 
effect of each variable on the probability of accepting VSI 
over SSB needs to be determined, once the decision to accept 
a separation bonus is made. Unlike the Navy, the Air Force 
did not offer VSI/SSB in three different phases. For the 
Navy, phase three in 1993 included additional benefits that 
would affect the probability of accepting VSI. In addition to 
this, as mentioned earlier, Air Force enlisted personnel were 
facing a RIF if enough members did not voluntarily leave. For 
this reason, the Air Force offered the programs twice, with 
the first deadline date of application submission on 31 
January 1992 and the second deadline on 15 April 1992. 
Although bonus eligibility expanded between the two deadline 
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dates to moving, deactivating or converting units, and to 
skills that were no longer needed, no benefits were added or 
~aken away as with Phase 3 of the Navy's offering. Tables 3-
2, 3-3 and 3-4 display the number of personnel submitting 
applications and those approved for VSI/SSB after the first 
deadline. As seen below, the number of submissions increased 
throughout 1992. 
TABLE 3-2 
ENLISTED AIR FORCE 
VSI/SSB SUBMISSIONS 
{as of February 5, 1992) 
V~I ssa IQTAL AfERQVEC 
Sergeant(Sgt.) 81 1,409 1,490 N/A 
Staff Sgt. 613 5,756 6,369 N/A 
Technical Sgt. 21 96 117 N/A 
Master Sgt. 2 l~ lB NlA 
VSI/SS8 TOTALS 720 7,274 7,994 N/A 
TABLE 3-3 
ENLISTED AIR FORCE 
VSI/SSB SUBMISSIONS 
(as of March 2, 1992) 
VSI SSB TO~L APPROVED 
Sergeant (Sgt. ) 165 2,443 2,608 1,511 
Staff Sgt. 1,202 10, 073 11,275 6,609 
Technical Sgt. 64 179 243 116 
Master Sgt. 11 32 43 20 
Sgt. Master Sgt. a Q a 0 
VSI/SS8 TOTALS 1,414 12,727 14,171 8,256 
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Sgt. Master Sgt. 
VSI/888 TOTALS 
TABLE 3-4 
ENLISTED AIR FORCE 
VSI/SSB SUBMISSIONS 





























Source: Air Force Times, February 17, 1992, March 2, 1992, and 
March 9,1992. 
Note: N/A = not available 
With respect to the logit models used in this analysis, 
the next step was to determine a means with which to measure 
the forecasting accuracy of the model. After estimating the 
binomi~.l logit model, econometric analysis and hypothesis 
testing can be accomplished in much the same way as for linear 
equations. However, unlike OLS regression, interpreting the 
coefficients of logit models is different. Each coefficient 
represents the impact of a one unit change in the independent 
variable in question on the logit--the log odds of the event--
not the pr~bability itself as in the linear probability model 
[Ref. 11:p. 52]. 
In estimating a logit model, it is possible to define a 
"notional person." This allows for determining the change in 
the probability of taking a separation bonus when one 
independent variable is allowed to change, while holding all 
other variables constant at specified values. This same 
procedure calculates the change in the probability for the 
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VSI/SSB choice, again changing one independent variable and 
holding all others constant. The marginal probability 
calculations appear in Chapter IV. The notional person for 
the •take' model from the entire population of eligibles, is 
defined to be a white male, who is married, has 2.5 children, 
and is a high school graduate. He is an E-6 or higher with 13 
years of service, a score of 57 on the AFQT, and is not in a 
highly technical occupational specialty. The unemployment 
rate in his home state is 7.31. 
The notional person in the VSI choice model is defined to 
be quite similar. He is also a white male, married with 2.5 
children, a high school graduate, E-6 or higher, and not in a 
highly technical occupation. He has 11. 5 years of service and 
a score of 56 on the AFQT. The unemployment rate in his home 
state is 7.28. All notional person attributes were based on 
the mean values of continuous variables and larger proportions 
for dummy variables. 
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IV. DA'l'A ADLYSIS UD IftBRPRB'l'A'l'IOII 
A. overview 
This chapter discusses the results of the binomial logit 
models introduced in Chapter III. Models for both the "take" 
decision and the program "choice" decision (VSI versus SSB) 
are presented, where "take" refers to those personnel that 
voluntarily accepted a separation program, and "choice" refers 
to the decision of which program to accept, VSI or SSB. 
Relevant variables for each model and their effects on the 
selected dependent variable are included. A comparison of 
these results, using FY92 Air Force data, with the results 
obtained from FY92 Navy data reported in An Analysis of 
Enlisted Early Separations Under the Navy's VSI/SSB Program: 
The Impact of Eligibility and Program Benefits, by s. J. 
Giarrizzo of the Naval Postgraduate School (Ref. 12], is also 
included. The data reported for both Navy FY92 and Air Force 
FY92 are from the Defense Manpower Center (DMDC), and use 
similar variable definitions. This comparison will highlight 
differences and similarities if any, in the acceptance 
behavior of the two cohorts, enlisted Air Force and enlisted 
Navy during FY92, the first year of the bonus program. 
This chapter also provides an analysis of the marginal 
probabilities associated with the independent explanatory 
variables in each model. This analysis allows for estimation 
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of individual effects of each explanatory variable on the 
probability of accepting a separation program and which 
program to accept, VSI or SSB. 
B. COKPARISOR 0~ ~Y92 AIR ~ORCB ARD NAVY 
The number of bonus eligibles for both FY92 enlisted Air 
Force and Navy personnel are displayed in Table 4-1. 
Succeeding tables, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4 and 4-5 compare the two 
groups, displaying means of relevant variables for the entire 
VSI/SSB eligible population, "TAKERS", "NONTAKERS" and for VSI 
takers. Logit models are run on the whole sample for enlisted 
Air Force personnel, all of whom are bonus eligible, for the 
take/not take decision. Logit models are also run on the 
choice decision (VSI/SSB), for a sample consisting of those 
personnel who are takers. 
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Table 4-1 
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ELIGIBLE FOR VSI/SSB 
PROGRAM AND NUMBER (AND PERCENT) 
OF TAKERS BY FISCAL YEAR 
NUMBER ELIGIBLE 
NUMBER TAKERS 
(% of eligibles) 
NUMBER ACCEPTING VSI 
(% of takers) 
NUMBER ACCEPTING SSB 










Source: " Estimates from Ref. 12, based 












8 Figures based on data provided by DMDC for FY92 
by 
As displayed in Table 4-1, although the number eligible 
for Air Force greatly exceeds that of Navy, the percentage 
take rate and VSI selection rate for both the Navy FY92 data 
and Air Force FY92 data were similar. This is especially 
surprising given that Air Force personnel faced the threat of 
a RIF whereas Navy personnel did not. Of course, because the 
eligible Air Force population was so much higher, 11,000 more 
airmen separated. This was the major goal of the Air Force 
program--to reduce total end strength. 
Table 4-2 displays the means of relevant variables for 
the bonus-eligible Navy FY92 and Air Force FY92 enlisted 
personnel. The sample of FY92 Air Force personnel appear to 
be more educated, by a slight margin. The proportion of high 
school graduates in the Air Force is 84.3 percent, slightly 
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higher than the 82.0 percent for the FY92 Navy sample. In 
contrast to this, the mean AFQT score is slightly lower for 
the Air Force, 57.0 percent compared to 58.5 percent for FY92 
Navy. MINORITY representation reveals the largest difference 
between the two services--37.2 percent for the Navy and 23.9 
percent Air Force. 
TABLE 4-2 
MEANS OF RELEVANT VARIABLES FOR THE 
VSI/SSB PROGRAM ELIGIBLE POPULATIONS 
IN NAVY FY93 AND AIR FORCE FY92 
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A Estimates from Ref. 12, based on data provided by 
DMDC for FY92 
8 Figures based on data provided by DMDC for Air 
Force FY92 
c Represents the percentage of E-6 personnel 
0 Represents the percentage of personnel E-6 and 
higher 
Other notable differences in Table 4-2 between the Navy 
and Air Force population are in the proportion high pay grade 
{HPG >= E-6), non-high school graduate (NONGRAD), military 
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spouse (MILSPS), and highly technical occupations (HITECH). 
The variable HPG is significantly lower for Air Force than 
Navy. This is based on the coding procedure for this 
variable. A majority of Air Force personnel that were 
eligible were E-5s, but in order to make a comparison with the 
results for Navy where HPG is coded for personnel in the 
paygrade E-6 only, the Air Force HPG variable is coded for E-6 
and above. Although the Air Force targeted E-4s and E-5s with 
9-19 years of service, after the initial offering of the 
programs the eligibility criteria were relaxed and expanded to 
more occupational special ties and groups. This included 
personnel from bases that were closing or scheduled to close, 
and also personnel who worked in occupations no longer deemed 
necessary by the Air Fore.:;. For this reason HPG2 is coded for 
E-6 and above, whereas in the Navy data HPG1 represents the 
percentage of E-6s. 
The variable NONGRAD is much lower for the Air Force than 
the Navy, and the variable MILSPS, much higher. Even though 
the variable HITECH is higher for the Air Force than Navy, it 
is still relatively low. Perceiving the Air Force to be the 
most technical branch of the Armed Services would explain its 
very low make up of non-high school graduates and its limited 
offerings of a voluntary separation to personnel holding 
highly technical ratings. As will be explained in Chapter IV, 
those in FITECH occupations are less likely to separate. 
Perform~nce of a frequency on educational certification 
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reveals that, from the total sample of Air Force eligibles, 
87,335 (84. 4 percent) are high school graduates. Further 
education, from one year of college up to receiving a 
doctorate accounts for an additional 15,343, leaving only 811 
non-high school graduates. The variable MILSPS means that the 
individual having to make the decision to separate has a 
spouse who is also currently in the military, but not faced 
with the decision of voluntary separating. This variable will 
also be discussed in further detail in Chapter IV. 
Table 4-3 displays the means of relevant variables used 
.1 •• che take and VSI acceptance models for those personnel who 
voluntarily separated in both the Navy FY92 and Air Force 
FY92. The variables that differed between the two services in 
Table 4-2 also differed in Table 4-3. However, one noteworthy 
difference in Table 4-3 is the HITECH variable. Only 29.2 
percent of the personnel voluntarily separating have a highly 
technical rating. Referring back to Chapter II, personnel 
receiving specialized training may be more likely to work in 
a highly technical field. These personnel may receive less 
generalized training, which is more difficult to transfer to 
the civilian labor market [Ref. 6]. This factor may easily 
contribute to the decision of a service member in a HITECH 
rating not to voluntarily separate. However, there is an 
offsetting effect in that HITECH occupations are often those 
that are transferable to civilian jobs. 
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TABLE 4-3 
MEANS OF RELEVANT VARIABLES FOR ELIGIBLE PERSONNEL 














































Source: A Estimates from Ref. 12, based on data provided by 
DMDC for FY92 
8 Figures based on data provided by DMDC for Air Force 
FY92 
Note: N/A = Not available 
Table 4-4 displays the mean values of selected 
explanatory variables for Navy and Air Force FY92 eligible 
personnel who chose not to accept a separation bonus. With 
the exception of the expected differences of variables 
previously mentioned, the two samples are relatively similar. 
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TABLE 4-4 
MEANS OF RELEVANT VARIABLES FOR 
STAYERS IN NAVY FY92 AND AIR FORCE FY92 









































Source: " Estimates from Ref. 12, based on data provided by 
DMDC for FY92 
8 Figures based on data provided by DMDC for Air Force 
FY92 
Note: N/A = Not available 
Table 4-5 displays the means of relevant variables for 
VSI takers. MINORITY representation is much lower among Air 
Force FY92 VSI takers compared to Navy FY92 takers, 14. o 
percent versus 22.4 percent, respectively. This table and 
Table 4-3, means of relevant variables for eligible personnel 
voluntarily separated in FY92, display the largest differences 
in the MINORITY variable. Also, the percentage of MALES 
accepting VSI in the Air Force sample falls slightly below the 
Navy FY93 figure. 83.2 percent compared to 82.5 percent. 




MEANS OF RELEVANT VARIABLES FOR VSI 










































Source: A Estimates from Ref. 12, based on data provided by 
DMDC for FY92 
8 Figures based on data provided by DMDC for Air Force 
FY92 
Note: N/A: Not available 
C. LOGI'l' MODEL RESULTS 
The results of the Air Force FY92 "Take" model are shown 
in Table 4-6. The results are very close to the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter III. The variables are highly 
significant, with the exception of UNEMP. MINORITY is 
negatively significant, supporting the findings of Mehay and 
Kirby that reenlistment rates for minority groups are 
generally higher than whites [Ref. 13:p. 45). MALE is 
negative and significant, reemphasizing that men historically, 
have higher retention rates than women. HPG has a very strong 
negative association in the take decision. This supports the 
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hypothesis that the closer an individual is to retirement, the 
less likely he or she is to voluntarily separate. MARRIED is 
significant and negative, but CHILD is positive. This 
indicates that having children positively influences an 
individual's decision to accept a separation bonus, but being 
married does not. HITECH and HSD are both positive and 
significant. The surprising result is of the variable 
NONGRAD, which has a strong positive effect on separation. 
This variable was hypothesized to be negative under the 
assumption that an individual not having a high school diploma 
would be more apt to stay in. From this model, not being a 
high school graduate positively influenced the decision to 
voluntary separate. This is contrary to expectations, but has 
strong statistical significance. UNEMP and MILSPS are both 
statistically insignificant in this model at the .05 level. 
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TABLE 4-6 
LOGIT MODEL RESULTS ON DECISION TO TAKE 
A SEPARATION BONUS AMONG ELIGIBLE AIR 















-2 LOG L 8167.076 with 11 DF 





























source: Data provided by Defense Manpower Data Center 
* Indicates variables not statistically significant 
at .05 level 
Table 4-7 displays a comparison of Navy FY92 and Air 
Force FY92 logit model results. As shown in this table, the 
results of the FY92 Air Force model differed from the FY92 
Navy model, althouJh the results closely approximate the 
hypothesized effects in Chapter III. The variables that 
actually come within close approximation of each other in the 
two models are MARRIED, MILSPS, UNEMP and HITECH. The signs 
were the same except for AFQT, which changed from positive in 




COMPARISON OF TAKE/NOT TAKE LOGIT MODEL 
RESULTS FOR FY92 NAVY AND AIR 
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A For a more indepth look at the Navy model results, see 
[Ref. 12] 
8 From column 1, Table 4-6 
Table 4-8 provides the results of the Air Force FY92 VSI 
model. 
TABLE 4-8 
LOGIT M0DEL RESULTS FOR THE VSI VERSUS SSB DECISION 
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Referring back to Chapt~r II, the hypothesized signs of 
the variables, Table 4-8 reveals that three fourths of the 
hypothesized signs are correct. With the exception of YOS and 
MARRIED, which W3r::.! hypothesized to be negative and MILSPS 
which was hypothesized to be positive, the remaining 
explanatory variables' signs support the hypothesis. The 
variable revealing surprising results is YOS. The logit model 
shows that YOS has a positive influence on an individual's 
decision to accept VSI over SSB. This decision in part, may 
be based on two facts; (1) the Air Force offered the programs 
to service members with 9-19 years of service, and (2) out of 
the entire eligiLle population (103,489) there were only 811 
non-high school graduates. The remainder of the sample 
included high school graduates and 15,343 service members who 
at a minimum had one year of college, with others having 
received doctorates. An individual, having already been to 
college would not need the lump-sum(SSB) to do the same. 
Perhaps this individual has a marketable degree and foresees 
no difficulty in gaining employment and therefore accepts VSI 
over SSB. Given the range in YOS, if the individual did have 
a college degree and was perhaps at the fifteen year point, he 
or she would probably start a second career and not need the 
lump-sum. 
Table 4-9 provide a brief summary of the Air Force FY92 
logit model results presented in table 4-8, along with 
selected results from the FY92 Navy model [Ref. 12:p. 51]. 
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- ----------------------------------------------------------~ 
This allows for a compar~son of variable significance, and 
whether the effect was positive or negative between the two 
"VSI versus SSB" model. 
TABLE 4-9 
A COMPARISON OF VSI LOGIT MODEL COEFFICIENTS 
FOR THE FY92 NAVY MODEL AND FY92 AIR FORCE MODEL 
INDEPENDENT FY92 NAVY FY92 
VARIABLE [Ref. 12]A AIR FORCE 
MINORITY -.204 -.434 
AFQT .006 .004 
MALE -.283 -.366 
YOS .300 .212 
MARRIED -.272 .094 
CHILD .069 -.319 
MILSPS -.442 -.225 
NON GRAD -.203 -1.639 
A For a more indepth look at the Navy model results, see 
[Ref. 12] 
Note: Variables not addressed in Giarrizzo are not reported 
in Air Force model. 
As table 4-9 shows, the VSI logit model results differ 
greatly between FY92 Navy enlisted and the FY92 Air Force 
enlisted. The largest difference is accounted for by the 
variable NONGRAD: -1.639(Air Force FY92) and -.203(Navy FY92). 
Other variables that show large differences are MARRIED and 
CHILO. These differences in variable coefficients can be 
attributed to the less homogeneous nature of the VSI/SSB 
decision makers than that of the total sample of eligibles 
within each group. Variables that are fairly close in 
magnitude are AFQT, YOS and MALE. 
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D. MARGINAL PROBABILITY RBSULTS 
This section provides additional background in 
understanding how the attributes of the "Notional Person" are 
determined. Tables 4-10 and 4-11 provide results of the 
"notional person" calculations for both the TAKE and VSI logit 
models (Tables 4-6 and 4-8), using the sample of eligible Air 
Force enlisted personnel and the sample of VSI takers, 
respectively. 
TABLE 4-10 
OVERALL AND MARGINAL PROBABILITIES FOR 'TAKE' MODEL 
(AIR FORCE EHLISTED PBRSORHBL FY92) 
PROBABILITY 
DESCRIPTION OF TAKING A MARGINAL 
OF INDIVIDUAL BONUS PROBABILITY 
(PERCENT) (PERCENT) 
1. WHITE MALE, MARRIED, HSD 21.5 
(base case) 
2. MINORITY MALE, MARRIED, HSD 14.8 -6.7 
3. WHITE FEMALE, MARRIED, HSD 24.7 +3.2 
4. WHITE MALE, SINGLE, HSD 26.5 +5.0 
5. WHITE MALE, MARRIED, HPG, HSD 3.3 -18.1 
6. WHITE MALE, MARRIED, NON GRAD 16.3 -5.2 
Note: "notional" individuals have average AFQT scores, are 
E-5 or lower (unless noted), and face the average 
unemployment rate for the entire sample. 
The results shown in Table 4-10 are quite interesting. 
The above calculations show that a minority male (all other 
variables held constant), has a low percentage of taking a 
bonus, 14.8 percent. This is a decrease of 6.7 percent from 
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the base case. This result is consistent with the logit model 
result where the MINORITY variable had the largest negative 
coefficient (-.4480). This result also lends support to the 
findings of Mehay and Kirby, in that minorities generally have 
a higher reenlistment rate than whites [Ref. 13]. Another 
variable showing a low calculated percentage of taking a bonus 
(3.3 percent), occurs for individuals in a high pay grade. 
This percentage decreases 18.1 percent from the base case. 
Referring back to Mehay and Kirby, the closer an individual is 
to retirement, the less likely he or she is to voluntary 
separate [Ref. 13]. The coefficient of HPG lends support to 
the expectation that the typical individual eligible for a 
bonus is not the average young airman, but an individual 
having served numerous years. The chances of this individual 
finding employment comparable to his/her current salary, 
regardless of the unemployment rate, is very low. Therefore 
this individual, having been successful moving up the ranks 
into a high paygrade category, would be more inclined to stay 
in. Not being a high school graduate shows a 16.3 percent 
probability of taking a bonus, but as the attributes change 
from the base case, which is being a high school graduate, the 
percentage decreases 5.2 percent. 
The highest calculated percentage of taking a bonus (26.5 
percent) belongs to the notional person who is a white male, 
single, a high school graduate, but not in a high pay grade. 
Again this supports previous studies (Ref. 13], and also the 
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observation that an individual not having served many years, 
and who is young would be more apt to voluntary separate, 
perhaps to use the monetary gains for further education. 
As the attributes of a person changes, so does the 
probability of taking a bonus, as displayed by the marginal 
prohability column. These results are expected and coincide 
with previous findings. Case 2 reveals that as race is 
changed from white to minority the percentage of taking a 
bonus dacreases (-6.7 percent). As gender is changed from 
male to female as in case 3, the percentage increases 
(+3.2 percent). When an individual is in a high paygrade, 
case 5, the percentage decreases dramatically ( -18. 1 percent) • 
Lastly, when the attribute is changed from high school 
graduate to non-high school graduate, the percentage of taking 
a bonus decreases (-5.2 percent). All of these results 
parallel the findings of Mehay and Kirby. 
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TULB .t-11 
VSX PROBUXLXTXBS(Total &D4 Karqiaal) 
AXR PORCB BKLXSTBD PBRSOaBBL 
PROBABILITY 
DESCRIPTION OF TAKING A 
OF INDIVIDUAL BONUS 
(PERCENT) 
1. WHITE MALE, MARRIED, HSD 7.8 
(base case) 
2. MINORITY MALE, MARRIED, HSD 5.2 
3. WHITE FEMALE, MARRIED, HSD 10.8 
4. WHITE MALE, SINGLE, HSD 7.1 








Note: "notional individuals" have average AFQT scores, are 
E-6 or higher, face the average unemployment rate for 
the entire sample, and have 11.5 YOS. 
As displayed in both Tables 4-10 and 4-11, women having 
the same attributes as men, have a higher calculated 
probability of both separating and taking the VSI over the 
SSB. As hypothesized, the effect of MALE is negative, 
contributing to historical fact of higher retention rates for 
men than women. The lowest calculated percentage from this 
sample again goes to the individual not having a high school 
diploma. This individual is a TAKER, and a taker of VSI. 
This is an unexpected result and contrary to previous 
discussion, concerning using the monetary gain for further 
education, which would suggest SSB would be the better 
decision. Even still, the pc-,rcentage is quite low. As in the 
TAKE probability calculations, the change to MINORITY ranks 
second to last in the VSI probability results also. 
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As explained for the take model, changing an individual • s 
attributes changes the probability of making some choice. The 
following marginal probabilities reflect the VSI decision over 
SSB. As the attributes change from Case 1 to Case 2, white to 
minority, the percentage of accepting VSI decreases (-2.6 
percent). If the individual is a female, the percentage 
increases (+3.0 percent). Finally, if the individual is not 
a high school graduate the percentage decreases (-6.2 
percent). Having accepted a separation program, an individual 
who is not a high school graduate would be more apt to chose 
SSB over VSI. SSB provides a lump-sum payment up front, which 
can be used for the completion of high school degree or 
equivalent and follow-on college education. 
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V. COIICLUSIOBS MD RBCOIIIUIIIDA'l'IOBS 
A. COIICLUSIOBS 
This thesis conducted an analysis of the voluntary 
separation behavior of enlisted Air Force personnel during 
FY92, using a data set of all personnel eligible for the 
separation bonus. The thesis extended previous research and 
analyses concerning the FY92 and FY93 VSI/SSB Navy programs 
conducted by Stephen L. Mehay and Mary Kirby, and by S. J. 
Giarrizzo. (Ref. 13, 12] As found in the analysis of this 
thesis, and by the analyses of both FY92 and FY92 Navy 
results, certain background variables significantly influence 
an individual's decision to accept a voluntary separation 
bonus. Comparisons of logit model results between FY92 Navy 
and Air Force reveal consistency in the effect and 
significance of the explanatory variables. These results 
indicate that similar decisions concerning voluntary 
separation were made by two separate cohorts (Navy and Air 
Force), for the same fiscal year (FY92). 
The hypothesized signs of the variables, displayed in 
Chapter III, on both the take decision and the VSI decision 
were closely supported. Referring back to Question 3 of the 
thesis, the accuracy of the predicted signs of specified 
explanatory variables provides a framework to predict the 
"take" behavior by future cohorts. 
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The focus of congress on the Departm~n~. of Defense 
becomes more intense as budget cuts across the board cause 
departments under DoD to tighten their belts. This includes 
a decrease in allocated funds and personnel. This alone calls 
for further VSI/SSB offerings. on the other hand, more 
opportunities are being opened up for women and minorH.:ies as 
the forces maintain, and in some cases, increase the 
representation thereof. Having a model that predicts the 
likelihood of acceptance, provides a means by which DoD can 
forecast the results of further use of the Voluntary 
Separation Incentive and the Special Separation Bonus as cost 
effective force shaping tools. 
B. RBCOMKBNDATIOII J'OR J'UR'l'BBR RBSBARCB 
It was not in the scope of this thesis to determine the 
effects of accepting a separation program when certain other 
factors play a part. For instance, with the threat of a 
potential RIF, an individual's decision to separate may have 
been made premature. Personnel that were in the non-critical 
occupational specialties and were the target for a potential 
RIF, may have been more apt to voluntarily separate. That is, 
they would avoid taking a chance of being forced out with a 
lesser amount of severance pay and would be likely to accept 
one of the separation programs. on the other hand, personnel 
that were eligible and met the eligibility requirements who 
would have taken a voluntary separation, but were denied 
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acceptance because of the importance of their occupational 
specialty to the Air Force, were not necessarily guaranteed a 
minimum twenty-year retirement. They were only exempt from 
the possible ensuing RIF. The decision making process would 
also undoubtedly be influenced if the restrictions of 
acceptance for non-eligible occupational specialties were 
relaxed. Widening the offerings to all occupational 
specialties, and then guaranteeing a minimum-twenty year 
retirement to those in the previous non-offered specialties 
codes, could possibly enhance the likelihood more personnel 
(in the critical specialties), would not voluntarily separate. 
Information from Air Force and Navy separation 
questionnaires may also be valuable in determining differences 
in factors that significantly influenced the separation 
decisions in the two somewhat different enviroments. Special 
questions would have to be constructed on the exit 
questionaires. However, the effort taken to construct the 
questions may be worth the extra cost in terms of the 
information elicited on the effectiveness of the VSI/SSB 
program when offered to personnel to leave, who would 
otherwise have stayed. 
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